

Message Text

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R 151000Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0393
INFO USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
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AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
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CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 14704

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: JA, CH
SUBJECT: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PFT

1. SUMMARY: SIGNING AUGUST 12 OF JAPAN-CHINA PEACE AND
FRIENDSHIP TREATY WAS CULMINATION OF PROCESS BEGUN WITH
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS IN 1972 AND PURSUED INTERMIT-
TENTLY SINCE THEN. JAPANESE MADE NO SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS,
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SECURED ALL THEIR MAJOR OBJECTIVES, AND FINESSED THOSE
ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESSED, I.E., SENKAKUS, SINO-SOVIET
TREATY, CONTINENTAL SHELF, SUCCESSFULLY ENOUGH THAT THEY
PRESENT INSUBSTANTIAL TARGETS FOR CRITICS. ACHIEVEMENT IS
LARGE FEATHER IN FUKUDA'S POLITICAL CAP, WHICH SHOULD
APPRECIABLY BOOST HIS CHANCES OF REMAINING IN OFFICE BEYOND
END OF YEAR.

2. ON OTHER HAND, WITHOUT BELITTling ITS IMPORTANCE,PFT IS MORE EASILY DEFINED IN TERMS OF WHAT IT IS NOT RATHER THAN WHAT IT IS. TREATY'S MAIN PRACTICAL EFFECT IS TO REINFORCE ALREADY ESSENTIALLY SOUND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOKYO AND PEKING. IT CONCEIVABLY COULD BE CATALYST FOR EVENTUAL LIMITED SINO-JAPANESE COOPERATION TOWARD THIRD-COUNTRY ISSUES, BUT IT DOES NOT SIGNIFY DRAMATIC STEP FORWARD IN JAPAN-CHINA TIES. PFT WILL LOWER TEMPERATURE OF SOVIET-JAPAN RELATIONS IN SHORT RUN, BUT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO HAVE PERMANENT LIMITING EFFECT ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOKYO-MOSCOW TIES (OTHER, FAR MORE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTRAINTS WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO OPERATE). TREATY SHOULD NOT MARKEDLY CHANGE "OMNIDIRECTIONAL" NATURE OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY, NOR WILL IT DIMINISH IMPORTANCE JAPAN ATTACHES TO ITS RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES. END SUMMARY.

3. PFT AND JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS:
WHILE SOME JAPANESE COMMENTATORS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT PFT MARKED BEGINNING OF NEW ERA IN JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS AND HISTORICAL TURNING POINT FOR REGION, MOST OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO LOAD TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE ON TREATY. MORE MODEST APPRAISAL SEEMS CORRECT. RATHER THAN REPRESENTING DRAMATIC STEP FORWARD IN JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS, PFT WAS PART OF CONTINUING EVOLUTION TOWARD EXPANDED TIES.

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4. SYMBOLIC MEANING OF PACT IS ARGUABLY VERY LARGE. PEKING'S CURRENT PRAGMATIC FOREIGN POLICY LINE AND ITS OPENING TO WEST HAS BEEN UNDERScoreD, A LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II HAS BEEN REMOVED, TWO GREAT NATIONS HAVE PLEDGED FEALTY TO CERTAIN SHARED IDEALS. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE,ON OTHER HAND, IS LIMITED. WHILE JAPAN HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO SOME BROAD PRINCIPLES SHARED WITH PEKING, ALL OF THEM UNOBJECTIONABLE UNLESS VIEWED FROM MOSCOW, THERE IS NO OBLIGATION TOWARD JOINT OR COORDINATED ACTION OR EVEN CONSULTATION. JAPANESE DO NOT SEE THEMSELVES ALLIED WITH PEKING IN ANY SENSE, EVEN IMPLICITLY, AND WILL BE QUICK TO DENY, WITH SINCERITY, SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT PEKING HAS DRAWN JAPAN INTO WEB OF ITS ANTI-SOVIET MACHINATIONS.

5. WHAT THEN DOES TREATY MEAN FOR JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS? BASICALLY IT SEEMS FROM HERE TO HAVE PROVIDED ADDITIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SYMBOLIC UNDERPINNING FOR AN ALREADY SOUND RELATIONSHIP. IN SHORT RUN, CONCLUSION OF TREATY WILL LEND IMPETUS TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS ACROSS THE BOARD--ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL, CULTURAL AND, IN BROAD SENSE, POLITICAL. OVER LONGER TERM IT COULD PROVE USEFUL AS A SORT OF SAFETY NET SHOULD RELATIONS THREATEN

TO DETERIORATE. IN TERMS OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR BILATERAL
RELATIONS, PFT'S SIGNIFICANCE ENDS ABOUT THERE. FEW IN GOJ
WOULD ARGUE THAT IT WILL HAVE TANGIBLE RAMIFICATIONS
REMOTELY COMPARABLE TO THOSE OF LONG TERM TRADE AGREEMENT,
OR OF BURGEONING TRADE AND TECHNOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS
WHICH EXIST OUTSIDE FRAMEWORK OF LTTA. NOR WILL PFT
HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON GENERALLY POSITIVE WAY JAPANESE PEOPLE
ALREADY FEEL ABOUT CHINA, WHICH IS GREATEST SINGLE FACTOR
IN SHAPING JAPANESE POLICY TOWARD PRC. INSTEAD, PFT IS
REFLECTION OF ALL THESE ELEMENTS, AND PERHAPS REINFORCES

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ALL OF THEM.

6. WHAT WILL THE SOVIETS DO?

FEELING HERE IS THAT THEY WILL NOT DO VERY MUCH. MOFA

SOVIET ANALYSTS HAVE FOR SOME TIME TAKEN VIEW THAT SOVIETS HAD CONCLUDED PFT WAS AN INEVITABILITY THEY COULD PERHAPS DELAY BUT NO LONGER DERAIL. SOVIETS WERE THEREFORE SEEN AS ATTEMPTING IN THEIR PROPAGANDA AND REPRESENTATIONS HERE
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TO SET STAGE FOR POST-PFT SITUATION IN WHICH THEY WOULD ARGUE THAT, TO RESTORE BALANCE IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY, JAPAN SHOULD MAKE COMPENSATORY MOVE TOWARD MOSCOW, I.E., CONCLUDE A GOOD NEIGHBOR TREATY WITHOUT REFERENCE TO NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE.

7. IN EFFORT TO MINIMIZE IMPACT OF PFT ON RELATIONS WITH USSR, JAPANESE BRIEFED SOVIET CHARGE' AN HOUR AFTER TREATY WAS SIGNED, REPORTEDLY ASSURING HIM OF JAPAN'S CONTINUING HIGH REGARD FOR USSR AND DESIRE TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS. JAPAN'S NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW, CAREFULLY HELD BACK FROM ASSUMING POST UNTIL TREATY WAS SIGNED, WAS DISPATCHED AUGUST 14 WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE SAME POINTS. INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE, ACCORDING TO JAPANESE PRESS, WAS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FIRYUBIN'S ADMONITION AUGUST 14 TO JAPANESE CHARGE' THAT JAPAN WILL HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE BY DEEDS, NOT WORDS, ITS FRIENDSHIP TOWARD MOSCOW.

8. JAPANESE ASSUME THERE WILL BE CHILL IN RELATIONSHIP IN WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, AND PERHAPS SOME DISCOMFORT IN CERTAIN SPECIFIC AREAS--FISHERIES IS REGARDED AS MOST LIKELY PRESSURE POINT. VICE MINISTER ARITA RECENTLY TOLD AMBASSADOR HE EXPECTED SOVIETS TO ATTEMPT TO STIR UP DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO TREATY BY PLAYING ON FEARS OF CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET DISPLEASURE. BUT HE THOUGHT JAPANESE PEOPLE WOULD REMAIN CALM AND SOVIETS WOULD SOON DROP THAT TACTIC. JAPANESE OFFICIALS GENERALLY TAKE VIEW THAT SOVIET SELF-INTEREST, AS WELL AS LIMITATIONS ON THEIR ABILITY TO AFFECT SITUATION, WILL CONSTRAIN SOVIET BEHAVIOR. AFTER PERIOD OF DIFFICULTY, THEY EXPECT RESTORATION OF SOMETHING APPROXIMATING NORMAL CORRECT IF COOL RELATIONSHIP. (NOT ALL JAPANESE TAKE SO RELAXED A VIEW, IT SHOULD BE NOTED. SOME WITHIN DIET, AND MOFA, ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY
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POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PFT, BELIEVE GOJ CONCLUDED TREATY WITHOUT ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCES, AND FEAR PERMANENT DAMAGE TO JAPANESE INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS SOVIET UNION.)

9. PFT AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:

ONE OF CONCERNS SOVIETS HAVE EXPRESSED REGARDING PFT IS THAT IT COULD COME TO BE REGARDED AS MODEL WHICH PRC WOULD THEN SEEK TO "IMPOSE" ON COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. HAVING CONVINCED JAPAN TO SIGN AN "ANTI-SOVIET" TREATY, THE FLOOD GATES WOULD BE OPEN FOR OTHER NATIONS IN REGION TO DO SAME, WHILE THIS MAY INDEED BE WHAT CHINESE HAVE IN MIND, WE SEE NO REASON WHY SOUTHEAST ASIANS SHOULD RUSH TO EMULATE JAPAN, AND IN ANY EVENT TREATMENT OF ANTI-HEGEMONY WOULD BE LESS CONSEQUENTIAL, AND ONE WOULD ASSUME LESS SENSITIVE ISSUE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THAN IT WAS FOR JAPAN. NONETHELESS, PFT ON ONE HAND MAY ENHANCE TO SOME EXTENT PRC STATURE AS FULL-FLEDGED PARTICIPANT IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS, WHILE IT PROBABLY ALSO ADDS TO JAPAN'S PRESTIGE AS MAJOR ASIAN POWER.

10. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT NOT ONLY SOVIETS BUT SOUTHEAST ASIANS HARBOR SOME CONCERNS THAT PFT COULD LEAD TO TACIT COOPERATION IN JAPANESE AND CHINESE APPROACHES TO REGION, IN PLACE OF SENSE OF IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL COMPETITION WHICH HERETOFORE HAS CHARACTERIZED THEIR INTERACTION. IN OUR VIEW, THESE WOULD BE UNNECESSARY CONCERNS; PFT WILL DO LITTLE TO ACCELERATE PROCESS OF SINO-JAPANESE ENTENTE OR POSSIBILITY OF COORDINATED POLICIES TOWARD THIRD COUNTRIES.

11. FINALLY, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SOME CONCERN IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA WITH RESPECT TO IMPLICATIONS OF PFT UPON JAPANESE ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD REGION. JAPANESE PRESS HAS DISCERNED FEAR IN JAKARTA, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN AFTERMATH OF PFT JAPAN WILL LOOK INCREASINGLY TOWARD CHINA

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AND AWAY FROM INDONESIA AS SOURCE OF OIL AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS. THAT MAY WELL HAPPEN OVER TIME, BUT IT WILL NOT BE RESULT OF PFT, NOR WOULD PFT HASTEN SUCH A PROCESS. (WE SAY THIS DESPITE SONODA REMARK TO PRESS AUGUST 14 TO EFFECT THAT PFT WAS "BRIDGE" BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA, AND MITI MINISTER KOMOTO WOULD BE FIRST MAN TO CROSS IT.) JAPANESE ARE OF COURSE INTERESTED IN CHINESE RESOURCES AND, EVENTUALLY, SIGNIFICANT CHINESE MARKETS. HOWEVER, THIS IS CONFIDENTIAL

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A PHENOMENON INDEPENDENT OF PFT, AND IN ANY EVENT, IN WHAT IS HARDLY A ZERO-SUM GAME, INCREASED JAPANESE FOCUS ON CHINA WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN REDUCED ATTENTION TO SOUTHEAST ASIA.

12. ONE OF MORE INTERESTING UNKNOWN IS EFFECT PFT MAY HAVE ON JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH HANOI AND POSSIBILITY OF JAPANESE PLAYING SIGNIFICANT INTERMEDIARY ROLE BETWEEN VIETNAM AND ITS SEVERAL ADVERSARIES. IT MAY BE THAT HANOI WILL CHOOSE TO INTERPRET PFT AS SIGNIFICANT JAPANESE MOVE IN DIRECTION OF CHINA WHICH HAS REDUCED GOJ BONA FIDES AS DISINTERESTED THIRD PARTY. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT PFT HAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED TOKYO'S CREDIBILITY WITH HANOI. (VIETNAMESE DIPLOMAT TOLD WESTERN COLLEAGUE IN TOKYO AUGUST 14 PFT WOULD NOT AFFECT HIS COUNTRY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN. HE WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT JAPANESE POLICY, AND PARTICULARLY JAPANESE AID, MIGHT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED.) IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT, WITH PFT NOW SAFELY TUCKED AWAY AND JAPAN NO LONGER CONCERNED ABOUT EFFECTS OF ITS INITIATIVES ON NEGOTIATIONS, IT WILL FEEL FREE TO TAKE ON EVEN MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN INDOCHINA.

13. MEANING FOR UNITED STATES:
PFT DOES NOTHING TO DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE JAPAN ATTACHES

TO ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. PFT HAS NOT CHANGED STRATEGIC REALITIES; IT HAS NOT LESSENED JAPAN'S NEED FOR AN ALLY ON WHICH TO RELY AS IT UNDERTAKES EXPANDED RELATIONS WITH ITS COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS. NOR OF COURSE HAS IT REDUCED IN ANY WAY JAPAN'S DEPENDENCE UPON ITS ECONOMIC TIES WITH UNITED STATES. WHILE PFT IS REFLECTION OF JAPAN'S MORE ASSERTIVE AND INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY, STRONG TIES WITH U.S. ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN FOUNDATION OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY.

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14. THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION THAT CONCLUSION OF PFT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH MOVEMENT TOWARD U.S.-CHINA NORMALIZATION CAN PROCEED MORE RAPIDLY-- THIS REPORTEDLY WAS AMONG SONODA'S BAG OF ARGUMENTS IN HIS PEKING TALKS. ACCORDINGLY, SOME JAPANESE MAY SUGGEST THAT FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY CHINESE IN NEGOTIATIONS AUGURS WELL FOR RESOLUTION OF PENDING ISSUES BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PEKING. ON OTHER HAND, THERE REMAINS STRONG BODY OF OPINION THAT HOPES U.S. WILL MOVE CAUTIOUSLY, MAINTAINING SOUND RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN WHILE, IN EFFECT, HELPING TO SCREEN JAPAN'S TAIWAN TIES. IT IS SUFFICIENT FOR MOST JAPANESE NOT TO GET BEHIND U.S., BUT THERE IS NO INCLINATION TO EXULT AT BEING AHEAD.

15. NEW PROBLEMS FOR TAIWAN? IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE DOUBT THAT PFT WILL UNDERMINE THE THRIVING UNOFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND ROC. THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE ANY SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN POLITICAL SUPPORT THE ROC CAN DRAW UPON IN THIS COUNTRY IN BEHALF OF STATUS QUO, AND THERE IS NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT PRC, WHICH ALMOST POINTEDLY REFRAINED FROM LITURGICAL TAIWAN REFERENCES DURING NEGOTIATIONS, SHOULD NOW BEGIN TO PRESS FOR CHANGES. IN ONE RESPECT, JAPAN-ROC TIES COULD BENEFIT FROM CONCLUSION OF PFT: WITH TREATY OUT OF WAY, GOJ MAY FEEL SOMEWHAT MORE RELAXED IN ITS DEALINGS WITH ROC, AND SOME OF MORE STRINGENT RULES GOVERNING THOSE TIES COULD BE EASED. A MOFA OFFICER RECENTLY OBSERVED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WHILE THERE WAS NOW A STRICT BAN ON TRAVEL BY GAIMUSHO PERSONNEL TO TAIWAN, "THAT MIGHT CHANGE WHEN PFT IS SIGNED."

16. IN REGARD TO TWO OTHER MAJOR PERIPHERAL ISSUES OF GOJ CONCERN, SENKAKUS AND CONTINENTAL SHELF, JAPANESE CAME OUT WELL. BY IN EFFECT DISMISSING SENKAKUS AS A NEGOTIATING CONCERN, PRC HAS COME CLOSE TO CANCELLING OUT WHATEVER EFFECT FISHING-FLEET INCURSION MAYHAVE HAD IN ASSERTING ITS

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TERRITORIAL CLAIM, THEREBY LEAVING JAPANESE DE FACTO CON-

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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

TROL OF ISLANDS INTACT. SIMILARLY, FAILURE TO MAKE ISSUE
OF CONTINENTAL SHELF AGREEMENT WITH ROK WOULD SEEM TO LEAVE
GOJ IN GOOD POSITION TO PROCEED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF
EXPLOITATION OF AREA AS LONG AS IT TAKES CARE NOT TO TWEAK
PRC NOSE IN PROCESS.

17. DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS. WHILE PFT COULD STILL OCCASION
SOME DEBATE WITHIN LDP AND DIET, IT APPEARS NOW THAT
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OPPONENTS OF TREATY WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY FINDING PROFITABLE ANGLE OF ATTACK. WORDING AND PLACEMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY CLAUSE PERMITS GOJ TO CLAIM THAT IT GOT ON ITS WAY ON ANTI-HEGEMONY. TENG HSIAO-PING STATEMENTS TO SONODA AUGUST 10 ON QUESTION OF SENKAKUS AND DISPOSITION OF 1950 SINO-SOVIET PACT WERE SO FORTHCOMING THAT NAKASONE AND OTHERS WHO HAD BEEN PREPARED TO SHOUT "PHONEY FRIENDSHIP" WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISARMED. AMONG OPPOSITION PARTIES, ONLY JCP HAS FAILED TO JOIN CHROUS OF PRAISE. RATIFICATION OF SEPTEMBER EXTRAORDINARY DIET SESSION IS PREORDAINED.

18. TREATY IS WITHOUT QUESTION FEATHER IN FUKUDA'S CAP, WHICH COULD WELL TIP BALANCE IN HIS MANEUVERS TO REMAIN AS PARTY PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER AFTER HIS TERM EXPIRES IN DECEMBER. LEAVING ASIDE HIS ABILITY OR WILLINGNESS TO DISSOLVE DIET AND HOLD ELECTION AS HE WOULD LIKE, FUKUDA AND SONODA HAVE DEMONSTRATED, WITH PRC COOPERATION, SKILLFUL MANAGEMENT ON BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND DOMESTIC FRONTS OF A TRICKY ISSUE. FUKUDA'S PRINCIPAL RIVAL, LDP SECGEN OHIRA, HAS BEEN CONTENT TO OFFER LOYAL SUPPORT, PERHAPS TAKING LONG VIEW THAT SUCH COOPERATION MIGHT ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR ARRANGEMENT WITH FUKUDA FOR AMICABLE TRANSITION WITHOUT SHOWDOWN, ALBEIT AT PRICE OF HAVING TO WAIT IN THE WINGS SOME MONTHS LONGER THAN HE WOULD LIKE. PFT IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH POLICY OHIRA HIMSELF HAS ADVOCATED, AND HE HAS LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO GET ON BANDWAGON. VISIT OF TENG HSIAO-PING IN OCTOBER TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR FUKUDA TO DRAW POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FROM PFT, INASMUCH AS NOT JUST SIGNING BUT VISIT ITSELF WILL BE INTENSELY COVERED MEDIA EVENT, WELL-TIMED TO SUSTAIN PRIME MINISTER'S MOMENTUM. ONE CAN ARGUE WHETHER PFT HAS OVERRIDING IMPORT

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FOR JAPANESE VOTERS -- A YOMIURI POLL RIGHT AFTER NATIONALLY TELEVISED SIGNING CEREMONY INDICATED ALMOST NO IMPACT ON FUKUDA'S (LOW) POPULARITY RATING -- BUT PRIME MINISTER'S CRITICS WITHIN LDP AS WELL AS OPPOSITION ARE REMARKABLY SILENT THESE DAYS. MANSFIELD

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